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Recent reports in the national and the regional media have described state and local government 
employees as earning more than workers in the private sector.  
 
The average state and local government worker does earn higher wages – but this is because they 
are, on average, older and substantially better educated than private-sector workers. More than half 
(55.4 percent) of state and local government employees in New England have a four-year college 
degree or more, and almost one-third (29.8 percent) have an advanced degree. By contrast, only 37.9 
percent of private-sector workers have a four-year college degree or more; and only 13.3 percent 
have an advanced degree. In New England, the typical state and local worker is also about four years 
older (45) than the typical private-sector worker (41). 
 
When state and local government employees are compared to private-sector workers with similar 
characteristics – particularly when workers are matched by age and education – state and local 
workers actually earn less, on average, than their private-sector counterparts. On this basis, the wage 
penalty for state and local government workers in New England is close to 3 percent. 
 
The wage penalty for working in the state and local sector is particularly large for higher-wage and 
better-educated workers. While low-wage workers in New England receive a small wage premium in 
state and local jobs (about 5 percent for a typical low-wage worker), the typical middle-wage worker 
earns about 3 percent less in state and local work, and the typical high-wage worker makes about 13 
percent less than a similar private-sector worker.  
 
These wage differences are also found across workers with different levels of formal education. 
High school graduates in the state and local sector in New England, for example, have a small wage 
premium (1.6 percent) relative to the private sector, while those with bachelor’s degrees experience a 
sizeable wage penalty (7.0 percent).  
 
State and local workers on average do receive higher non-wage benefits than workers in the private 
sector. The average difference in total benefits (including retirement income, health and other forms 
of insurance, holidays, sick leave, and other forms of non-wage compensation), though, is modest. 
Benefits offered by state and local governments are roughly as generous as those offered by large 
firms in the private sector. Even after taking benefits into account, state and local government 





State and local government budgets are under severe strain.
1 Rather than blame the recession, which 
has simultaneously slashed tax revenues and increased the demand for social services,
2 some 
conservatives have argued that excessive pay for public employees is the real cause of the financial 
woes.
3 Several recent reports in the media have reinforced this view by emphasizing that, on average, 
government employees earn more than workers in the private sector.
4 
 
As emphasized by earlier research focused on the national-level data and on a handful of large states 
(Bender and Heywood (2010), Schmitt (2010), and Keene (2010)), the depiction of public sector 
workers as “overpaid” ignores that state and local government workers have much higher levels of 
formal education and are older (and therefore generally more experienced) than workers in the 
private sector. When state and local government workers are matched with private-sector workers of 
the same age and the same level of education, the public employees actually earn less than their 
private-sector counterparts. The pay penalty for public-sector workers is particularly large for the 
most educated and most experienced workers. 
 
This analysis demonstrates that the same is true in New England. After controlling for age, 
education and other relevant demographic factors, the average state and local government worker in 
New England faces a wage penalty compared to the average private sector worker. There is a small 
wage premium for the lowest-paid public-sector workers, but the highest-paid public sector workers, 
face a sizeable wage penalty. Despite a modest advantage over the average private sector worker 
work-related benefits, the average state and local government worker experiences a total 
compensation penalty. 
 
The State & Local Government Workforce 
 
According to nationally representative data from the Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey 
(CPS), in 2009, the 51 U.S. state governments (including the District of Columbia) together 
employed about 6.0 million workers.
5 Local governments employed an additional 10.7 million 
workers. Combined state and local government employment of 16.7 million workers account for 
13.6 percent of all employees nationally (see Table 1; also see Appendix Figure 1 for state-level data 
on the state and local government share of employment).
6 In New England, total state and local 
                                                 
1  See Lav and McNichol (2010) for a review of the squeeze on state budgets. 
2  See Baker and Deutsch (2009). 
3  See, for example, Jacoby (2009), Unshackle Upstate (2009), and Greenhut (2010). 
4  See, for example, Dennis Cauchon, “Federal Pay Ahead of Private Industry,” USA Today, March 8, 2010 (which has 
generated almost 2,000 comments) at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-03-04-federal-pay_N.htm; and 
the front page story by David Sherfinski, “Growth in government-worker pay outpaces private sector, data show,” 
The Washington Examiner, March 30, 2010. 
5  Data refer to workers age 18 to 64. All analysis, unless otherwise stated, uses the CEPR extract (version 1.5) of the 
Current Population Survey. The data and full details on the extract are available at http://www.ceprDATA.org/. 
6    We exclude the self-employed and limit our analysis to workers ages 18 through 64. CEPR & PERI  The Wage Penalty for State and Local Government Employees in New England / 5
 
 




The state and local government workforce differs from the private-sector workforce in three 
important ways. First, as a group, state and local public employees are substantially better educated 
than workers in the private sector. As Figure 1 demonstrates, over half (55.4 percent) of all state and 
local workers in New England had a four-year college degree or more; nearly one-third (29.8 
percent) had an advanced degree. By contrast, only 37.9 percent of private-sector workers had a 
four-year college degree or more, and just 13.3 percent had an advanced degree. One reason for the 
high level of education in the public sector is the strong concentration of educational occupations in 
state and local government employment (see Appendix Table 1 for a list of the ten largest 
occupations in state and local governments in New England). 
 
Second, state and local employees are also consistently older than private-sector workers. The typical 
(median) private-sector worker in New England is 41 years old, compared to 45 for the typical state 
and local government employee nationally (see Table 1). Finally, in almost six in ten (58.3 percent) 
of state and local government workers in New England are women, compared to less than half (47.9 
percent) of private-sector workers. 
 
Since better-educated and older workers generally earn more than less-educated and younger 
workers, comparisons of pay for workers in state and local government with pay for workers in the 
private sector should take these systematic differences into consideration. Similarly, given the large 
differences in the share of women in the two sectors, evaluations of pay across the two sectors 





















                                                 
7   Analysis of the CPS ORG for New England, and for the individual New England states combines five years worth of 





Characteristics of state and local employees, age 18-64, 2005-09*  
  U.S. average  New England  Massachusetts  Connecticut 
   private  state & 
local  private  state & 
local  private  state & 
local  private  state & 
local 
Number (millions)  103.2  16.7  5.4 0.8 2.4 0.3 1.3 0.2 
% of total  
employment     13.6%     12.8%     12.7%     13.3% 
Education (%)           
Less than high 
school  8.5  2.5  5.9  2.0  5.8  2.0  6.5  2.0 
High school  31.1  19.9  29.7 19.3 27.4 18.4 29.4 20.1 
Some college  30.6  26.7  26.5  23.4  23.8  22.4  27.0  23.6 
College degree  20.9  27.4  24.6 25.6 27.0 26.0 23.8 21.3 
Advanced  8.9  23.5  13.3  29.8  16.0  31.2  13.4  32.9 
Age (%)           
18-24  13.8  7.1  13.5  6.7  13.4  6.9  12.6  6.2 
25-34 23.9  20.4  21.2  16.6 22.6 16.0 20.3 18.8 
35-44  23.8  24.2  25.6  25.0  26.1  24.6  25.9  26.3 
45-54 24.2  28.1  25.1  30.4 24.1 30.7 26.2 29.0 
55-64  14.3  20.3  14.6  21.3  13.7  21.8  15.1  19.7 
Median age  40  44 41 45 40 45 41 44 
Women (%)  46.2  60.2  47.9  58.3  48.2  57.0  47.3  58.2 
Notes: Analysis of CEPR extract (version 1.5) of CPS ORG.  
* The first two rows of Table 1 are based on data from 2009. The remaining rows for New England use data 


















































Pay Differences for State & Local Workers 
 
Figure 2 summarizes the results from an analysis of state and local public employee pay that takes 
education, age, gender, and other factors into consideration. State and local government workers 
initially appear to have a large earnings premium relative to private-sector workers, but the wage 
premium turns into a wage penalty for government work once we control for workers’ age and 
education. 
 
Before taking any of the systematic differences between public- and private-sector workers into 
account, the data suggest that state and local workers in New England earned almost 11 percent 
more on average than workers in the private sector, , which is consistent with both the national-level 
data and media reports that find higher public-sector wages. (See Appendix Table 2 for additional 
details for these estimates.)
8 Once we control for workers’ education and age, however, the state and 
local public employee wage premium becomes almost a 6 percent wage penalty in New England.
9 In 
Connecticut and Massachusetts the wage penalties were somewhat smaller, at 2 percent and 4 
percent, respectively. After adding a further set of controls for gender, race, and region of residence, 
state and local workers in New England received about 3 percent less than workers with the same 
education and age levels in the private sector. In Massachusetts, the public-sector wage penalty is 
about 2 percent and in Connecticut the public-sector pay premium is small and not statistically 
different from zero. 
                                                 
8   The public-sector wage premium is about the same for state employees as for local government employees (Appendix 
Table 2, Column 2), except in Connecticut, where the premium is considerably larger for state workers. 





The analysis so far, both here and in earlier media reports, has focused largely on the “average” 
worker in the state and local and private sectors. The effects of public-sector employment on 
earnings, however, may be different for workers at the bottom, middle, and top of the wage 
distribution, or for workers with different levels of educational attainment.  
 
Using quantile regression techniques, we can analyze the effect of being a state and local government 
employee on the earnings of a worker across the wage distribution.
10 Figure 3 presents results of an 
analysis of the effects of state and local government employment on wages for workers at different 
points of the wage distribution, from low-wage workers at the 10th percentile (who make more than 
10 percent of all workers, but less than 90 percent of all workers) through the median worker (50th 
percentile) to high-wage workers in the 90th percentile. (Appendix Table 3 includes the full set of 
results for 9 deciles across the wage distribution.) 
 
For low-wage workers, working in the state and local sector provides a small wage boost relative to 
working in the private sector. For the lowest-wage workers in Figure 3, those at the 10th percentile 
of the wage distribution, working in a state and local government job in New England raises wages 
almost 5 percent relative to a comparable worker in the private sector.
11 The premium is smaller in 
Connecticut (3.8 percent) and larger in Massachusetts (8.3 percent). In New England the public-
                                                 
10 A standard ordinary least squares regression, such as those in Table 2, estimates the effects of independent variables 
at the mean of the dependent variable. Quantile regressions use analogous techniques to estimate the effects of 
independent variables at specified quantiles of the dependent variable, such as the 10th, 20th, 50th, or 90th percentile 
of the dependent variable. For a discussion of quantile regression, see, among many others, Johnston and DiNardo 
(1997). For a recent analysis of the effects of unionization on workers at different points in the wage distribution, see 
Schmitt (2008). 
11 All quantile regressions fit using Stata’s sqreg command. 
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sector premium falls to 3 percent for workers at the 20th percentile and to just below 2 percent for 
workers at the 30th percentile. Above the 40th percentile of the wage distribution, state and local 
government workers in New England face a wage penalty, although the premium in Connecticut 
and Massachusetts does not disappear until the 50th percentile. For workers at the 60th percentile, a 
state or local job in New England means about a 5 percent pay cut relative to a comparable private-
sector worker; and the penalty increases steadily for higher wage workers: -7 percent at the 70th 
percentile, -10 percent at the 80th percentile, and -13 percent at the 90th percentile.
12  
A similar pattern holds for state and local workers in Connecticut (though the magnitude of both 
the premiums and the penalties are smaller than for New England as a whole) and in Massachusetts 
(where the pay premium for lower-wage workers is higher than for New England as a whole). The 
gradual shift from wage premium for low-paid workers to substantial wage penalty among higher-
paid workers is similar for the nation as a whole and in Massachusetts. In Connecticut, the wage 
premium at the bottom of the wage distribution and the wage penalty at the top of the wage 
distribution are both smaller than the rest of New England and the national average.  
                                                 
12 These results – small state-and-local premiums for lower paying jobs and larger state-and-local penalties for middle 
and better paying jobs – are similar to Miller (1996), who compared jobs, rather than workers, and used different data 
(from the BLS’s now-discontinued Occupational Compensation Survey Program). Miller concluded: “The OCSP 
job-level data show that, contrary to comparisons based on overall averages or broad occupational groups, private 
industry paid better for virtually all professional and administrative occupational job levels and for the majority of 
technical and clerical job levels. For blue-collar workers, the situation was mixed” (p. 22); and “...at the lowest paying 
jobs, State and local governments often paid the same as or better than private industry. But, as pay rose, the private 
sector paid increasingly better” (pp. 24-5). 
 





















10th 50th 90th 10th 50th 90th 10th 50th 90th 10th 50th 90th








*Not statistically different from zero.CEPR & PERI  The Wage Penalty for State and Local Government Employees in New England / 10
 
 
This pattern ― a public-sector wage premium for low-paid workers and a penalty for high-paid 
workers ― is bolstered by analysis of wage differentials by educational attainment levels. Figure 4 
shows the regression-adjusted wage differential for state and local government workers by education 
level for the New England region as well as for Massachusetts and Connecticut.
13 Controlling for 
age, gender, race, and region, state and local government workers in New England with lower levels 
of education receive a small wage premium relative to those in the private sector, while highly 
educated workers face a sizeable wage penalty. For example, high school graduates working in state 
and local governments in New England had 1.6 percent higher wages than their similarly educated 
counterparts in the private-sector. Meanwhile, college-educated workers in New England earned 7.0 
percent lower wages if they worked for state and local governments. (Results for all education levels 




Total Compensation Differences for State & Local Workers 
 
State and local government workers face a wage penalty relative to their counterparts in the private 
sector, but workers also value the compensation delivered through on-the-job benefits, including 
health insurance, retirement, and other “fringe” benefits. Non-wage compensation is higher, on 
                                                 
13 These wage differentials are based on similar OLS regressions, and use the same data, as those reported in Appendix 
Table 2; the underlying regressions include controls for age, gender, race, and region, but are run separately by 
education level. The national results in Figure 4 are based only on 2009 data, while the New England results use data 
from 2005 to 2009. 
 
FIGURE 4
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average, for state and local government workers than it is in the average firm in the private sectors, 
but limitations in the benefits data make a direct comparison between equivalently skilled workers in 
the private and public sector impossible. There are no large, nationally representative data sets that 
contain wage and benefits data as well as information on workers’ education and demographic 
characteristics. The CPS contains a wealth of data on wages and demographics, but little on benefits. 
The best source of information on benefits, the National Compensation Survey (NCS) does not 
include individual-level data on education and demographic factors.  
 
While we cannot directly control for educational attainment and experience, we can compare 
average non-wage benefits in state and local governments with those in larger firms in the private 
sector. Benefits account for one-third (32.9 percent) of total compensation for the average state and 
local government worker, and nearly one-third (31.5 percent) for private sector workers at firms 
with 100 or more employees.
14 At private sector firms with 500 or more workers, the benefit share 
rises to 33.0 percent, essentially identical to the share for state and local governments. The actual 
difference in non-wage compensation reflected in the NCS data is smaller than what is sometimes 
imagined because the NCS includes a broad range of non-wage compensation. One important 
difference is that many state and local government workers (including those in Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, and Rhode Island) are not eligible for Social Security; public sector workers in those 
states rely exclusively on their pensions, while those in the private sector combine pensions, 401(k) 
benefits, and Social Security.  
 
Bender and Heywood (2010) have used one approach to incorporate the effect of benefits on the 
conclusions reached in our earlier analysis. They take data from the National Compensation Survey 
on the share of benefits in total compensation in the state and local and in the private sectors to 
adjust the state and local sector wage differential. Their calculations show that the higher non-wage 




Table 2 applies Bender and Heywood’s approach to our earlier calculations for New England.
16 
Since the NCS does not report data on state and local benefits at the New England or state level, 
Table 2 uses the national figures for the benefit share of total compensation from “large” firms in 
the private sector to adjust the wage penalty results in Figure 2.
17 As Table 2 demonstrates, even 
after inflating state and local wages by a factor designed to capture the higher benefits in the public 
sector, state and local government workers continue to face a penalty in total compensation after we 
control for workers’ formal education and their age. Using private sector firms with 100 or more 
workers as the benchmark for the benefits differential, we estimate that the average state and local 
                                                 
14 The benefit share is based on quarterly data from 2004 to 2009. Author’s analysis of BLS Employer Cost for 
Employee Compensation data accessed September 2010. 
15  This conclusion is confirmed by Keene’s (2010) analysis of public sector compensation in New Jersey. 
16  Bender and Heywood (2010) use benefit data from 2004 to 2008 in their analysis. We use data up through 2009 to 
reflect data availability as well as to better match the time frame from our wage regression.  
17  This calculation assumes that the benefit share of compensation is the same in New England as in the rest of the 
country. Analysis of the National Compensation Survey data confirms that this is the case for the total private sector. 
The published NCS data do not allow us to compare the benefit share of compensation in New England for the state 
and local sector, or for large firms in the private sector. CEPR & PERI  The Wage Penalty for State and Local Government Employees in New England / 12
 
 
government worker in New England still receives four percent less in total compensation than an 
equivalently well-educated and experienced worker in the private sector (Table 3, Column 1). Taking 
additional demographic factors into account (gender, race, and state controls), the total 
compensation penalty for state and local workers in New England remains 1.4 percent (Column 2).
18  
 
If we use even larger private sector firms (those with 500 or more workers) as a benchmark, then the 
total compensation penalty is even larger. Taking all of the demographic controls into account, the 
total compensation penalty for state and local workers in New England is nearly four percent when 
the wage penalty is deflated by benefits differences in larger firms.  
 
Our findings for New England are consistent with the national-level results in Bender and Heywood 
(2010); and consistent with Keene’s (2010) results for state and local government workers in New 
Jersey, using a different methodology. 
 
TABLE 2 
Implied total compensation penalty for state and local government workers 
 
(1) 




With gender, race, &  
regional controls 
(3) 




With gender, race, &  
regional controls 
  firms with 100+ employees  firms with 500+ employees 
National -4.4%  -1.7% -6.5%  -3.8% 
New England  -3.5%  -1.4%  -5.6%  -3.5% 
Notes: Wage penalty results from Appendix Table 2 - from regression analysis using CPS ORG - modified by benefit 





On average, state and local government employees in New England earn more than private-sector 
workers. But, state and local workers are also, on average, older and substantially better educated 
than private-sector workers. When state and local government employees are compared to private-
sector workers with similar characteristics ― particularly when workers are matched by age and 
education – state and local workers actually earn less, on average, than their private-sector 
counterparts. The wage penalty for working in the state and local sector is particularly large for 
higher-wage workers. Taking benefits into account reduces ― but does not eliminate ― the wage 
penalty for state and local workers. 
                                                 
18 The most relevant comparison is between state and local governments and large private firms, because all state, and 
most local, governments employ well above 100 workers and compete most directly with large private firms for 
workers. If we adjust the estimated wage differential instead using the benefits differential between the state-and-
local sector and private firms of all sizes, then the total compensation differential falls to 1.2 percent nationally and 
0.2 percent in New England when controlling for age and education. When also controlling for race, gender and 





APPENDIX FIGURE 1 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1 
Ten Largest Occupations, New England State and Local Public Employees, 2005-09 
Rank  Occupation  Share of total (%) 
 State public employees 
1 Postsecondary  teachers  8.6 
2  Bayliffs, correctional officers, jailers  4.8 
3 Social  workers  3.7 
4  Managers, all other  3.7 
5  Secretaries and administrative assistants  3.7 
6  Elementary and middle school teachers  2.6 
7  Nursing, psychiatric, and home health aides  2.5 
8  Police and sheriff’s patrol officers  2.5 
9 Counselors  2.4 
10  Lawyers, judges, magistrates  2.4 
Total    36.7 
Local public employees 
1  Elementary and middle school teachers  20.5 
2  Secondary school teachers  9.3 
3 Teachers  assistants  7.4 
4  Fire fighters  4.4 
5  Police and sheriff’s patrol officers  4.3 
6  Special education teachers  4.1 
7  Secretaries and administrative assistants  3.2 
8  Janitors and building cleaners  2.9 
9 Education  administrators  2.8 
10  Counselors  1.7 
Total    60.5 













APPENDIX TABLE 2 
State and Local Employee Wage Differentials, 2005-09 
(percent differences; standard errors in parentheses) 
 
(1) 
No controls:  
regression with 
combined state & 
local data  
(2) 
No controls:  
regression with 
separate state & 
local data 
(3) 




With age, education, 
race, gender &  
region controls 
(a) National         
 State & local  12.8**  --  -6.4**  -3.7** 
 (0.4)    (0.4)  (0.3) 
 State  --  13.2**  --  -- 
   (0.6)     
 Local  --  12.6**   ―    ―  
   (0.5)     
(b) New England         
 State & local  10.9**   ―   -5.5**  -3.4** 
 (0.5)    (0.5)  (0.4) 
 State   ―   13.1**   ―    ―  
   (0.8)     
 Local   ―   9.7**   ―    ―  
   (0.6)     
(c) Connecticut         
 State & local  14.4**   ―   -2.1#  0.6 
 (1.2)    (1.1)  (1.0) 
 State   ―   23.4**   ―    ―  
   (1.9)     
 Local   ―   9.3**   ―    ―  
   (1.5)     
(d) Massachusetts         
 State & local  11.9**   ―   -3.7**  -2.3# 
 (1.5)    (1.3)  (1.3) 
 State   ―   11.4**   ―    ―  
   (2.5)     
 Local   ―   12.2**   ―    ―  
   (1.7)     
Age & education controls  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Gender, race &  region controls  No  No  No  Yes 
Notes: Analysis of CEPR extract of CPS ORG. The dependent variable is the log of hourly wages; ordinary least 
squares regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** indicates statistically significantly different from zero at 
the one percent level; * 5 percent level, and; # 10 percent level. 
 
 




APPENDIX TABLE 3  
State and Local Employee Wage Differentials, by Wage Quintile, 2005-09 
(percent differences; standard errors in parentheses) 






































10th  $8.25   5.9**  $9.04   4.6**  $9.29   3.8*  $9.25   8.3** 
    (0.3)    (0.7)    (1.9)    (2.3) 
20th 10  3.4**  11.14  3.2** 11.67  2.7  11.43 7.8** 
      -0.4     (0.6)     (1.7)     (2.2) 
30th  12  1.2**  13.47  1.8**  14.22`  3.9**  13.92  4.7** 
    (0.4)    (0.4)    (1.3)    (1.7) 
40th  14.05 -1.4** 15.91  -0.4 16.98 2.6* 16.44  1.4 
      (0.4)     (0.5)     (1.1)     (1.7) 
50th  16.52  -3.6**  18.7  -2.5**  20.16  1.1  19.66  -3.0* 
    (0.4)    (0.5)    (0.9)    (1.4) 
60th  19.23 -5.6**  22  -4.7** 23.88  -0.1  23.16 -5.5** 
      (0.5)     (0.5)     (1.1)     (1.2) 
70th  23.08  -6.9**  26.27  -7.4**  28.37  -1.6  27.54  -8.1** 
    (0.3)    (0.5)    (1.1)    (1.5) 
80th  28.83 -9.1** 31.92  -10.0** 34.24  -3.0**  34  -10.8** 
      (0.5)     (0.7)     (1.1)     (1.9) 
90th  38.45  -11.3**  42.12  -12.8**  43.9  -5.5**  44.95  -11.8** 
    (0.6)    (0.7)    (1.6)    (1.7) 
Notes: Analysis of CEPR extract (version 1.5) of CPS ORG. The dependent variable is the log of hourly wages; quantile 
regressions with bootstrapped standard errors. All regressions include controls for age, education, race, region; regres-
sion for all also includes a control for gender. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** indicates statistically signifi-
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APPENDIX TABLE 4 
New England State and Local Employee Wage Differentials by Education, 2005-09 
(percent differences; standard errors in parentheses) 
  National  New England  Massachusetts  Connecticut 
Less than high school .011  0.005  -.05  .088 
 (.02)  (.03)  (.08)  (.07) 
High school degree only  .025**  0.016#  .016  .049* 
  (.007)  (.009)  (.028)  (.021) 
Some college, no degree .006  -0.017*  .061*  .016 
 (.006)  (.009)  (.025)  (.02) 
BA degree only  -.08**  -.07**  -.063*  -.044# 
  (.007)  (.009)  (.025)  (.023) 
Advanced degree  -.114** -.06**  -.07**  -.012 
 (.008)  (.01)  (.025)  (.02) 
Notes: Analysis of CEPR extract (version 1.5) of CPS ORG. The dependent variable is the log of hourly wages; ordi-
nary least squares regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** indicates statistically significantly different 

























Baker, Dean and Rivka Deutsch. 2009. “The State and Local Drag on the Stimulus.” Washington, DC: Center for 
Economic and Policy Research. 
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/stimulus-2009-05.pdf 
 
Belman, Dale and John Heywood. 1993. “The Truth About Public Employees: Underpaid or Overpaid?” Washington, 
DC: Economic Policy Institute.  
http://www.epinet.org/briefingpapers/1993_bp_truth.pdf 
 
Bender, Keith A. and John S. Heywood. 2010. “Out of Balance? Comparing Public and Private Sector Compensation 
Over 20 Years.” Washington, DC: Center for State and Local Government Excellence and National Institute on 
Retirement Security. 
 
Greenhut, Steven. 2010. “Class War: How Public Servants Became our Masters.” Reason (February), 
http://reason.com/archives/2010/01/12/class-war/singlepage 
 
Jacoby, Jeff. 2009. “Myth of the Underpaid Public Employee,” Boston Globe, September 30, 2009. 
 
Johnston, Jack and John DiNardo. 1997. Econometric Methods (4th Edition). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Keene, Jeffrey. 2010. “Are New Jersey Public Employees Overpaid?.” Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute. 
http://www.epi.org/publications/entry/BP270 
 
Krueger, Alan B. 1988. “Are Public Sector Workers Paid More Than Their Alternative Wage? Evidence from 
Longitudinal Data and Job Queues,” in Richard B. Freeman and Casey Ichniowski (eds.), When Public Sector Workers 
Unionize, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Lav, Iris J. and Elizabeth McNichol. 2009. “New Fiscal Year Brings No Relief From Unprecedented State Budget 
Problems.” Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=711 
 
Miller, Michael A. 1996. “The public-private pay debate: what do the data show?” Monthly Labor Review 119(5):18-29. 
 
Schmitt, John. 2008. “The Union Wage Advantage for Low-Wage Workers.” Washington, DC: Center for Economic 
and Policy Research.  
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/quantile_2008_05.pdf 
 
Schmitt, John. 2010. “The Wage Penalty for State and Local Government Employees.” Washington, DC: Center for 
Economic and Policy Research. http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/wage-penalty-2010-05.pdf 
 
Unshackle Upstate. 2009. “New York’ Double Standard: How Public Employee Pay and Benefits Have Outpaced the 
Private-Sector.” Rochester, NY. http://www.unshackleupstate.com/files/UUDSReport.pdf 
 